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I. INTRODUCTION
A government employee is sitting at home when he gets a phone call. 
On the other end of the line is his co-worker John s attorney, who informs him 
that John has been badly injured in a worksite accident. The attorney asks the 
government employee to testify as to John s state both before and after the 
accident. Rather than being able to simply help his friend, the government 
employee is instead stuck between a proverbial rock and a hard place. He can 
testify truthfully and potentially face termination from the career he has worked 
all his life to build, or he can refuse to testify, saving his career, but sacrificing 
both his friend and the pursuit of justice in the process. 
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Always design a thing by considering it in its next larger context a
chair in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, an environment 
in a city plan, 1 said Eilel Saarinen, who designed buildings and not laws; but 
the judiciary must also consider the context when building laws through 
precedent. This Note explores the importance of context, as well as content, when 
judges rule on employment discrimination cases stemming from the speech of a 
public employee. 
The federal circuit courts are divided on the question of whether a public 
employee who is testifying in court is 
2 for the purposes of First Amendment protections.3
To follow the approach of the Third and Fifth Circuits would create an 
irrebuttable presumption that any truthful testimony on any matter could not 
operate as the basis for disciplinary action unless the government could satisfy 
the balancing test, balancing the free speech interests of an employee against the 
interest of the employer in operating efficiently. 
Alternatively, to follow the approaches of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits leaves public employees with a motivation to lie under 
oath to preserve their jobs or to refuse to testify and face potential contempt 
charges. 
This Note argues for a third interpretation, borrowing from both 
approaches. It argues that courts should operate under a presumption that 
testimony under oath is on a matter of public concern that can be rebutted on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Part II of this Note sets forth the background of employee protections in 
the public sector as compared to the private sector. Part III lays out the current 
state of the law and how it sets up the current circuit split. Part IV examines that 
circuit split. Part V shows the failures of the approaches in these circuits. Part VI 
provides the proposed alternative approach, a rebuttable presumption. Part VII 
shows how to rebut the proposed presumption. Part VIII provides the conclusion 
to this Note. For those readers well-versed in employment law, Parts II and III 
may be review, but they are likely necessary for the less versed reader. 
1  Hadley Keller, AD Remembers the Extraordinary Work of Eilel and Eero Saarinen,
ARCHITECTURAL DIG. (July 31, 2014), https://www.architecturaldigest.com/story/saarinen-father-
and-son. 
2 Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1988). 
3  Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651 (10th Cir. 2019); Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 
1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Latessa 
v. N.J. Racing Comm n, 113 F.3d 1313 (3d Cir. 1997); Wright v. Ill. Dep t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 
40 F.3d 1492 (7th Cir. 1994); Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th 
Cir. 1989); Arvinger, 862 F.2d 75. 
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
Public employees may only be subject to adverse employment actions 
when such action will promote government efficiency.4 Public employment 
protections go even further than requiring cause, also requiring the government 
employer give the government employee at least 30 days advanced written notice 
(unless a crime has been committed) of the adverse action, at least 7 days to 
answer and provide evidence, a right to representation by an attorney, and a 
written decision with specific reasons for the adverse employment action.5 These 
protections are afforded to all public employees, except for those specifically 
enumerated by statute.6 Even if a public employer correctly takes adverse action 
against its employee for cause and following all statutory requirements in the 
process a public employee still has a right to appeal at a hearing before the 
Merit Systems Protection Board with counsel from an attorney or representative.7
At-will employment exists in direct contrast with these for cause 
requirements. At-will employment in the private sector is a long-standing 
tradition in the United States, traceable to a treatise written in 1877 by Horace 
Wood.8 While it is now accepted that Wood introduced the concept of at-will 
employment by misrepresenting authority, he was responsible for nationwide 
acceptance of the rule.9 In fact, shortly after the publishing of this treatise, many 
states quickly adopted the concept of at-will employment in the private sector as 
the norm.10 Under at-will employment, an employer may terminate an employee 
4  5 U.S.C.A. § 7513(a) (West 2020). 
5 Id. § 7513(b). 
6 Id. § 7511(b). The enumerated positions not provided the protection of this subsection are 
employees appointed by and with advice of the Senate; who are in a position of confidential, 
policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character as determined by the President, 
Office of Personnel Management, or the president of an agency; who are appointed by the 
President; who are receiving an annuity from the Civil or Foreign Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund; who are members of the Foreign Service; who serve within the Central 
Intelligence Agency or the Government Accountability Office; who serve within the United States 
Postal Service, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the Panama Canal Commission, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an intelligence component of the 
Department of Defense, or an intelligence department of the military; aliens or non-citizens who 
serve outside the United States; or who serve within the Veterans Health Administration (with 
exceptions). Id. 
7 Id. §§ 7513(d), 7701(a). 
8 Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 793 n.8 (Conn. 1984); see also, H.G. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877) [hereinafter WOOD, MASTER AND 
SERVANT].
9 See Magnan, 479 A.2d 781.
10  Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) ( e think the rule is correctly 
stated by Mr. Wood, and it had been adopted in a number of states. ); In re Phila. Packing & 
Provision Co., 4 Pa. D. 57 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1894) (quoting WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT, supra
note 8, § 134) (  general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will; and if the servant 
3
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at any time, and for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all, so long as 
such firing is not prohibited by law.11
A. The Rise: Jurisprudence Leading to Pickering
In 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the idea that 
public employees lose First Amendment protections as a condition of 
employment.12 This alone shows that public employees are afforded some greater 
protections than at-will, private-sector employees. In fact, the Court required a 
balancing test weighing the interest of the employee in speaking on matters of 
public concern and the interest of the government in promoting efficiency.13 Mr. 
Marvin Pickering was a schoolteacher in Illinois who sent a letter to the local 
newspaper disagreeing with a new proposed tax policy.14 Were Mr. Pickering a 
private sector employee, his employer could have simply terminated him as an 
at-will employee for speech, but with the ruling in Pickering v. Board of 
Education,15 the Court actually increased the protections afforded to public 
employees by requiring this balancing test.16
This concept of protecting public employees started back in 1952 with a 
dissent in Adler v. Board of Education,17 in which Justice William O. Douglas 
wrote that he could not accept public employees losing their civil rights by nature 
of employment.18 This dissent was adopted by the Court 15 years later in 
seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof ). The Author 
would like to note that the court in In re Phila. Packing & Provision Co. cited to § 134 when the 
correct section containing this quote is actually § 136. See also Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 
43 A. 609, 609 10 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899) (adopting at-will employment as promulgated by 
Wood as the default employment status); Harrod v. Wineman, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (Iowa 1910) 
( n this country it is held by an overwhelming weight of authority that a contract of indefinite 
employment may be abandoned at will by either party without incurring any liability to the other 
for damages. The cases are too numerous to justify citation. ); McCollough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 
11 A. 176, 178 (Md. 1887) ( nless there was a mutual understanding, it is only an indefinite 
hiring. ); East Line v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex. 1888) ( hen the term of service is left to 
the discretion of either party, or the term left indefinite, or determinable by either party, that either 
may put an end to it at will, and so without cause. ).
11  Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 617 (Utah 2015). These legal exceptions to at-
will employment include Title VII (barring termination based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), NLRB section seven (barring termination based on unionization, 29 
U.S.C. § 157), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (barring termination based upon disability, 
42 U.S.C. § 12112), among others. 
12  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
13 Id.
14 Id. at 564. 
15  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
16 Id. at 568. 
17  342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
18 Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Keyshian v. Board of Regents,19 when the Court rejected the idea of public 
employees losing their right of expression by the nature of their employment with 
the government.20
With that in mind, the Court developed a balancing test, balancing the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees. 21
B. The Fall: Connick and Garcetti 
The tides turned in 1983. In Connick v. Myers,22 the Court seemingly 
limited these protections afforded to public employees, writing that if a public 
employee s speech is not on a matter of public concern, then it is unnecessary 
for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge. 23 The Court held that if speech 
was not on a matter of public concern, the government should enjoy wide 
latitude  in employment decisions without intrusion by the judiciary.24 While 
employers should be receptive to criticism by their employees, the First 
Amendment does not require it.25 Four Justices dissented, with Justice Brennan 
writing that the decision would result in depriving the public of valuable 
information related to public officials.26
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,27 the Supreme Court of the United States 
drastically limited the free-speech protections afforded to public employees. The 
Garcetti Court established a test for determining whether public employees
speech is constitutionally protected: 
Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two 
inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections 
accorded to public employee speech. The first requires 
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First 
Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer s
reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility 
of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes 
whether the relevant government entity had an adequate 
19  385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
20 Id. at 606. 
21 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
22  461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
23 Id. at 146. 
24 Id.
25 Id. at 148. 
26 Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
27  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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justification for treating the employee differently from any other 
member of the general public.28
C. The Current Circuit Split 
The protection provided to public employee speech in Pickering, and 
then limited in both Connick and Garcetti, establishes the basic state of 
protections afforded to speech by public employees today. Public employees do 
have more protection than at-will private sector employees, but they do not enjoy 
unbridled First Amendment protection whenever they speak. 
In Garcetti, the Court held that public employees may be afforded 
constitutional protection if they are speaking on a matter of public concern. This 
Note focuses on this second prong of the Garcetti Pickering analysis to examine 
whether or not employee speech delivered under oath constitutes a matter of 
public concern. 
The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have considered this 
issue by applying a case-by-case analysis of whether a public employee testifying 
under oath is speaking on a matter of public concern.29 By contrast, the Third and 
Fifth Circuits have both held that testimony under oath is a matter of public 
concern per se.30
III. BACKGROUND
A. Garcetti–Pickering Analysis Prong Two Primer 
Americans first received their constitutional freedom of speech in 
1791.31 As discussed above,32 while the Supreme Court has decided cases that 
have certainly developed the field, the current circuit split shows that this area of 
adjudication is far from complete. 
If public employees feel their right to free speech has been violated by 
their employers, they may bring a suit.33 In a suit by public employees claiming 
that their employers violated their First Amendment right to free speech,34 the 
28 Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted). 
29 Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651 (10th Cir. 2019); Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 
1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Wright 
v. Ill. Dep t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 40 F.3d 1492 (7th Cir. 1994); Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt., 
862 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1988). 
30  Latessa v. N.J. Racing Comm n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997); Johnston v. Harris 
Cnty. Flood Control, 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989). 
31  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
32 See supra Part II. 
33  42 U.S.C.A § 1983 (West 2020). 
34  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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first prong of the analysis asks whether the employees were speaking as 
citizens.35 The second prong of the analysis examines whether the employees 
were speaking on matters of public concern.36 In other words, if a public 
employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, his employer 
may not sanction him without overcoming a balancing test that would justify 
treating the employees differently than some random member of the 
community.37 These two prongs are properly analyzed separately as two distinct 
questions.38
This Note and the circuit split it analyzes are focused on this second 
prong, whether or not the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern. 
This developing area of First Amendment protection for public 
employees has been properly and conveniently broken down by the Tenth Circuit 
into a five-part test, asking 
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee s
official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public 
concern; (3) whether the government s interests, as employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to 
outweigh the plaintiff s free speech interests; (4) whether the 
protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse 
employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have 
reached the same employment decision in the absence of the 
protected conduct.39
If the public employee is speaking as a citizen, a determination of law, 
made by the presiding court, must be made of whether the citizen speech is on a 
matter of public concern.40 If a court finds that a public employee is speaking as 
an employee or on a matter of private concern, it need not move any further to a 
balancing test under prong three.41
35  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ( t cannot be [denied] that the State 
has interests in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it 
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. ). 
36 Id. at 574. 
37  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
38  Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court broke the 
two inquiries  into separate questions  in Garcetti). 
39  Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019).
40  Greisen v. Hanken, 925 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2019) ( Whether speech is on a matter of 
public concern is a question of law, determined by the court, and reviewed by us de novo. ). 
41  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1982). 
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1. Matters That Are of Public Concern
It is already clear that testifying under oath is speech as a citizen to 
satisfy the first prong of the Garcetti Pickering analysis.42 The next question to 
answer whether the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern is to 
be answered based on the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record. 43 This inquiry is a question of law, for the 
presiding court to determine, and not one of fact.44 While there is no bright-line 
rule written by the Court to establish whether a matter is of public concern, 
Supreme Court cases do provide guidance in the determination. [T]ypically 
matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large
are matters of public concern.45 In addition to these cases, when public 
employees exercise their right to free speech on a topic unrelated to their public 
employment, they may enjoy First Amendment protection without justification 
far stronger than mere speculation  to validate infringing on the employee
freedom of speech.46 The Supreme Court has already provided several examples 
of what qualifies as a matter of public concern in various cases through the years. 
When a public employee testifies pursuant to a subpoena about a public 
corruption scandal, the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern.47
The Court recognized the importance of the context of subpoenaed testimony.48
When testimony was given pursuant to a subpoena, the Court first examined this 
context and then examined the content of the speech.49
The Supreme Court has held that a matter raised in private may still be 
a matter of public concern.50 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District51 illustrates the opposite situation than that which is at question in this 
Note where an employee would be speaking in public about a potentially 
private matter. 
Public employees filing suit to allow them to receive honoraria for 
speaking engagements are speaking on matters of public concern.52 The Court 
42  Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014). 
43 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 48. 
44 Id. at 148 n.7. 
45  City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004). 
46 Id. (citing United States v. Nat l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465, 475 (1995)). 
47 Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. 
48 Id. at 238. 
49 Id. at 240 (discussing public corruption). 
50  Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 16 (1979). In Givhan, the 
employee spoke with her supervisor about racially discriminatory hiring practices. Id. at 413. The 
Court found this matter to be of public concern. Id. at 417. 
51  439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
52  United States v. Nat l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995). 
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reasoned that because these speeches were addressed to a public audience, were 
made outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their 
government employment,  the employees were speaking as citizens on a matter 
of public concern.53 The ban in question further impos[ed] a significant burden 
on expressive activity. 54
A public teacher s letter to a newspaper regarding school funding is 
discussing a matter of public concern.55 In Pickering, the employee s letter 
amounted to an attack on the school board s handling of budget increase requests, 
as well as the allocation of the financial resources they receive.56 The Court found 
that the interest of employers in limiting their employees  contribution to public 
debate was not greater than the government s interest in limiting a similar 
contribution by a non-public employee.57
The offensiveness of an employee s speech is not outcome-
determinative in an analysis of whether the employee is speaking on a matter of 
public concern.58 In Rankin v. McPherson,59 two public employees were 
speaking in the presence of a third about the attempted assassination of then 
President Ronald Reagan.60 One employee said, if they go for him again, I hope 
they get him. 61 The Court said that although the employee s comments may 
have been inappropriate or controversial  in character, a potential presidential 
assassination is certainly a matter of public concern.62
While the Supreme Court has not established a bright-line rule to 
determine whether a matter is of public concern, cases have provided guidance 
from which at least a partial rule can be deduced: if the content, form, and context 
of a statement relates to a matter of concern to the public at large, then it is on a 
matter of public concern, regardless of the offensiveness of the speech in 
question. 
2. Matters That Are Not of Public Concern
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government 
53 Id.
54 Id. at 468. 
55  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968). 
56 Id. at 566. 
57 Id. at 573. 
58  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
59  438 U.S. 378 (1987). 
60 Id. at 381. 
61 Id.
62 Id. at 387 88. 
9
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officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. 63
A public employee speaking on matters of personal interest is not 
speaking on a matter of public concern.64 In Connick, the employee, an assistant 
district attorney, distributed a questionnaire around her office.65 The employer 
had told the employee that she was being transferred to a different office against 
her wishes.66 In response, the employee created the questionnaire which asked 
about the transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the 
level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work 
in political campaigns. 67 The district court found that the questionnaire was the 
reason for her termination.68 The Court held that the questionnaire was not about 
a matter of public concern and did not afford her protection under the First 
Amendment.69 Sheila Myers was not disclosing the office s failure to perform its 
duties; she was not disclosing wrongdoing or breach of public trust; and she was 
not evaluating the performance of her office.70 Instead, she was gather[ing] 
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. 71 The Court 
did recognize that one question regarding work in political campaigns was on a 
matter of public concern.72
In City of San Diego v. Roe,73 the Court found that a police officer who 
produced videos of himself stripping in a police uniform and masturbating to be 
outside the sphere of public concern and found that his termination was 
constitutionally lawful.74 The appellate court below had found that the officer 
should enjoy First Amendment protection because the speech was unrelated to 
his employment and occurred outside the workplace.75 The Court disagreed and 
found that because the officer referenced his law enforcement work on his eBay 
page where he sold the videos along with police paraphernalia (including 
uniforms from the department for which he worked), he was speaking as a public 
63  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
64 Id. at 147. 
65 Id. at 141. 
66 Id. at 140. 
67 Id. at 141. 
68 Id. at 142. 
69 Id. at 148. 
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 149. It seems the Court disregarded the nature of this question because the 
questionnaire as a whole largely concerned private matters. 
73  543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
74 Id. at 84. 
75 Id. at 81. 
10
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employee.76 The content of one of the videos in particular called the mission of 
the employer and the professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute. 77
The Supreme Court has not established a bright-line rule to determine 
whether a matter is of public concern, as explained above. Neither has the 
Supreme Court established a bright-line negative definition stating what is not
speech on a matter of public concern. Just as cases have provided guidance as to 
what is speech on a matter of public concern, cases have also provided guidance 
from which at least a partial rule can be deduced for when speech is not a matter 
of public concern: speech solely on matters of private interest that speak on the 
mission of the employer without touching upon political, social, or other concern 
is not speech on a matter of public concern. 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
As noted above, the circuit courts are divided over whether testimony 
under oath is a matter of public concern. This part of the Note outlines the two 
competing readings of public concern  that the circuits have developed in their 
effort to answer this question. The first approach is driven by the notion that 
testimony under oath is so important to the public that testimony is a matter of 
public concern per se. The second approach is driven by a case-by-case analysis 
that does not acknowledge the fact that a speaker is testifying as particularly 
important, instead analyzing testimony under oath as if it were any other form of 
speech. This Note concludes that both of these approaches ultimately fail to 
create a successful test for when speech is delivered under oath in the form of 
testimony. 
A. Circuits That Hold That Testimony Under Oath Is a Matter of Public 
Concern Per Se 
Drawing on Supreme Court cases regarding testimony by public 
employees,78 two circuits have held that when public employees testify under 
oath, they are speaking on a matter of public concern per se. The Third and Fifth 
Circuits ignore the content of speech and solely examine the context when 
analyzing free speech claims by government employees. 
76 Id.
77 Id. The video in question portrayed the officer in a police uniform issuing a traffic citation, 
then revoking it, before stripping and masturbating. Id. at 79. 
78  Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Roe, 543 
U.S. 77; United States v. Nat l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Wieman v. Updegraff, 
344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Johnston v. Harris County 
Flood Control District79 in 1989, holding that [w]hen an employee testifies 
before an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a 
context that is inherently of public concern. 80 Carl Johnston was a supervisor 
with the Harris County Flood Control District, a government employer.81
Johnston had worked as an employee since 1950 and as a supervisor since 1977.82
In 1980, a fellow employee filed an equal employment suit against the Harris 
County Flood Control District.83 During the hearing, Johnston testified against 
his employer.84 Following this testimony, the government employer began a 
series of retaliatory employment actions, ending in telling Johnston to accept a 
demotion.85 When Johnston refused this demotion, he was fired.86 Although the 
Harris County Flood Control District pointed to various acts by Johnston to 
justify his termination, the Fifth Circuit found these to be pretextual and that the 
employer s true motivation was Johnston s testimony at the equal employment 
opportunity hearing.87
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that allowing the government to retaliate 
when testimony harms the government would undermine and compromise the 
judicial process.88 The court reached a per se rule finding public concern when 
government employees were testifying to remedy the difficult choice that public 
employees would face when under oath either testify truthfully and face 
termination, or lie under oath and perjure themselves to protect their jobs.89 The 
court wrote that the goal of criminal, civil, and grand jury proceedings was to 
discover the truth, a goal sufficiently important to render testimony given in 
these contexts speech of public concern. 90 To avoid government retaliation 
against employees, and to promote employee testimony spoken freely and 
truthfully, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit to decide 
that testimony is a matter of public concern per se, satisfying the second prong 
of a Garcetti Pickering analysis.91
79  869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989). 
80 Id. at 1578. 






87 Id. at 1571 73. 
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Eight years after Johnston, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Latessa v. New Jersey Racing Commission.92 The court held that a public 
employee s truthful testimony before a government adjudicating or fact-finding 
body, whether pursuant to a subpoena or not, is a matter of public interest. 93
Mr. Donato Latessa was employed as a harness horse races judge by the 
New Jersey Racing Commission, a government employer.94 Mr. Latessa had 
been a judge for the New Jersey Racing Commission since 1988 and a judge at 
the Meadowlands race track since 1992.95 Mr. Fancesco Zanzucki was an 
executive director of the New Jersey Racing Commission.96 A three-judge panel 
was to impose penalties when rules were broken which could then be reviewed 
by directors, such as Mr. Zanzucki.97 In 1993, Mr. Zanzucki began breaking this 
rule by telling Mr. Latessa what penalties to impose before the three-judge panel 
had decided.98 In the same year, Mr. Latessa testified before the Office of 
Administrative Law, detailing this violation by Mr. Zanzucki.99 The very next 
day, Mr. Zanzucki sent a memorandum to the chairman of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission stating that it would no longer employ Mr. Latessa as a judge.100
Prior to Latessa, the Third Circuit had held that testimony pursuant to a 
subpoena was a matter of public concern.101 In Latessa, the court extended its 
ruling to cover voluntary appearances to testify.102 The Third Circuit emphasized 
the context of the speech, rather than the content, in deciding that sworn 
testimony is a matter of public concern per se.103
B. Circuits That Hold That Testimony Under Oath Is Examined Under the 
Second Prong on a Case-By-Case Basis, Like Any Other Speech 
At about the same time that the Third and Fifth Circuits were 
emphasizing the context of speech testimonial and under oath four circuits 
ignored the context and solely examined the content of the speech. The Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits ignore where speech took place and only 
examine what was said to decide if a public employee is speaking on a matter of 
92  113 F.3d 1313 (3d Cir. 1997). 
93 Id. at 1319 (citing Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
94 Id. at 1315. 
95 Id.
96 Id.




101  Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996). 
102 Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1317. 
103 Id.
13
Longnecker: Content, Context, What's Next? A <em>Garcetti-Pickering</em> Anal
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
692 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123 
public concern. These case-by-case courts decided several cases largely ignoring 
the context of the speech. 
In 1988, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Arvinger v. Mayor 
& City Council of Baltimore.104 The court first recognized that the Supreme 
Court analyzed questions of public concern by examining the content, form, and 
context  of the speech in question.105 The Fourth Circuit then held that context 
of speech cannot be elevated over its content and did not protect the public 
employee s speech, holding that it was not on a matter of public concern.106
Stephen Arvinger was a school police officer in Baltimore, who was 
arrested when Baltimore City Police discovered marijuana in his van.107 Mr. 
Arvinger was traveling with a Ms. Diane Diggs at the time of arrest.108 An 
investigation found that the marijuana belonged to Ms. Diggs, who was 
subsequently fired.109 Ms. Diggs subsequently filed a sex discrimination suit 
based on the disparate treatment that she and Mr. Arvinger received.110 During 
this suit, Mr. Arvinger was questioned by the Baltimore Community Relations 
Commission.111 Mr. Arvinger was fired following this hearing, with his employer 
claiming that he was lying to the Commission.112 The district court found that 
Mr. Arvinger s speech was on a matter of public concern because it was in the 
course of an official investigation, but the Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that 
it was irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that the statement was made in 
the course of an official hearing. 113
In 1994, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Wright v. Illinois 
Department of Children & Family Services.114 The court emphasized the 
importance of the content of speech and not the context, finding that sworn 
testimony by an employee does not always constitute protected speech.115
Margaret Wright was a social worker for the Illinois Department of 
Children and Family Services.116 Ms. Wright and her employer disagreed about 
104  862 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1988). 
105 Id. at 79 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 76. 
108 Id.




113 Id. at 79. The Fourth Circuit did not examine whether Mr. Arvinger had lied under oath. 
Had it done so, this case would be outside the purview of this Note. 
114  40 F.3d 1492 (7th Cir. 1994). 
115 Id. at 1501, 1503. 
116 Id. at 1494. 
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and fought over a case involving sexual abuse of a minor.117 The department 
removed Ms. Wright from the case and refused to protect the minor as she saw 
necessary.118 Ms. Wright then filed a written report with a juvenile judge 
detailing what she saw as errors and what she believed the judge should do.119
The judge agreed with Ms. Wright and continued a protection order for the 
minor.120 The next conflict between Ms. Wright and her employer occurred when 
Ms. Wright testified at the trial in the case.121 Ms. Wright was placed on leave, 
but subpoenaed to testify while on that leave.122 Ms. Wright claimed that 
employment retaliation occurred every time that she testified, and she filed suit 
against her employer.123 The court rejected this argument and held that the 
content of speech is the most important factor.124
In 1999, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Padilla v. South 
Harrison R-II School District.125 Despite being compelled to answer questions 
on cross examination, the court found that the context of compelled testimony 
did not overcome the content of speech for First Amendment protection.126
Padilla was a physical education teacher and high school coach in 
Missouri.127 Another local teacher was found guilty of raping and sexually 
abusing four boys from 1992 to 1993.128 During this period, a student spoke about 
sexual fantasies she had of Padilla and told a story about having sex with 
Padilla.129 Padilla was eventually suspended when the student s parents made a 
complaint.130 Padilla requested a formal hearing and was reinstated after the 
board found no immoral conduct had occurred.131 Criminal charges were brought 
stemming from these accusations, and Padilla testified that he had no problem 
with extramarital affairs, that he had never had an extramarital affair himself, and 
that if a minor was out of school or not a student, a sexual relationship could be 
117 Id. at 1495. 
118 Id. at 1497. 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1497 98. 
122 Id. at 1498. 
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1501. 
125  181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999). 
126 Id. at 996 97. 
127 Id. at 994. 
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 995. 
131 Id.
15
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appropriate.132 Padilla was fired, in part based upon his public statements  in 
court.133
In 2000, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Maggio v. 
Sipple.134 The Eleventh Circuit held that Ms. Maggio s testimony as a witness in 
an administrative appeal was not speech on a matter of public concern.135
Ms. Maggio sued the State Department of Labor and Employment 
Security for retaliating against her in violation of her First Amendment rights.136
When Ms. Maggio s supervisor, Ms. Davis, was charged with insubordination, 
Ms. Davis filed a grievance.137 Ms. Maggio testified at this grievance hearing, 
and Ms. Davis s insubordination charge was overturned.138 Ms. Maggio also 
testified at a later hearing regarding Ms. Davis s later termination, which was 
also overturned.139 When Ms. Maggio filed suit, the Eleventh Circuit specifically 
found that the context of an administrative appeal hearing was not public.140 The 
Eleventh Circuit also found that the content of Ms. Maggio s testimony did not 
have the purpose of raising a matter of public concern.141
In 2019, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Butler v. Board of 
County Commissioners of San Miguel County.142 The Tenth Circuit expressly 
rejected a per se rule making sworn testimony a matter of public concern and 
found no First Amendment violation when a government employee was demoted 
for truthful testimony at a state court hearing.143
Mr. Butler was a government employee for the Colorado Road and 
Bridge Department.144 Mr. Butler was demoted when he testified in state court 
as a character witness.145 The Tenth Circuit directly rejected a claim that sworn, 
truthful testimony is a matter of public concern per se.146 The court was 
concerned that such a rule ignored the weight of the content of the speech in 
132 Id.
133 Id. at 996. 
134  211 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000). 
135 Id. at 1354. 




140 Id. at 1352 53. 
141 Id. at 1353. 
142  920 F.3d 651 (10th Cir. 2019). 
143 Id. at 657. 
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question.147 The Tenth Circuit wrote that giving testimony has consequences, 
while salut[ing] the courage of such witnesses  in the face of witness 
retaliation.148
V. FAILURES OF PRIOR APPROACHES
On one side of the circuit split, we have cases that heavily weigh the 
context of the speech in question when determining if a public employee has 
spoken on a matter of public concern. These circuits find the context of truthful, 
sworn testimony to be so vital to the public that it is automatically a matter of 
public concern. On the other side of the split, we have courts that emphasize the 
content of speech when answering the same question. 
In Connick, the Supreme Court made clear that questions of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 
statement. 149 The Supreme Court has not made clear which of these three 
factors if any should be given more weight. However, it is clear that all three 
must be examined. In the most recent Supreme Court case on this matter, the 
Court examined context first, but it has yet to establish this as a rule that must be 
followed.150 Because the content, form, and context of speech must be analyzed, 
both a per se rule of public concern when a public employee is testifying as well 
as a rule that effectively ignores the context of speech are both incorrect 
approaches. 
A. A Per Se Rule Holding Testimony To Be a Matter of Public Concern at 
All Times Is Overbroad 
The greatest failure of the Third and Fifth Circuits is that they ignore the 
content of employee speech.151 A rule that finds public employees are speaking 
on a matter of public concern whenever they testify truthfully fully overlooks 
what was actually said. That is not to say that these circuits ignored the Supreme 
Court in reaching their holdings. It may well be that these courts found the 
context of testimony to be so compelling that it fully outweighed the content of 
the speech. Nevertheless, even if the Third and Fifth Circuits have not acted 
contrary to the Supreme Court s decisions, it does not mean that they established 
the correct rule. 
Some legal scholars argue that it is particularly difficult to justify legal 
decisions in hard cases.152 These are the cases where the result is more difficult 
147 Id. at 653 54. 
148 Id. at 660. 
149  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 48 (1983) (emphasis added). 
150 See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
151 See supra Section IV.A. 
152  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1975). 
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to determine based on either statute or as in the case of speech by public 
employees precedent.153 If hard cases occur when statutes and precedent are 
murkier, easy cases occur when statutes and precedent are clear. In order to make 
just legal decisions, the goal should then be to make cases easier to decide. Not 
only does this further judicial economy154 but it allows even-handed justice to be 
dealt out. In the interests of economy and justice, any law promulgated by 
Congress or ruling handed down by a judge or justice should make hard cases 
easier. A poorly drafted law or a poorly worded decision can be examined under 
an easy-case-hard-case analysis. If a ruling makes future hard cases easier, then 
it is a good ruling. If a ruling makes a future case harder, then it is a bad ruling. 
Other factors certainly come into consideration, but an easy-case-hard-case 
analysis should be part of the jurisprudential approach of presiding courts. 
Within these per se circuits, hard cases certainly become easier to decide. 
In effect, hard cases become easy cases. This may be good for judicial economy; 
however, it can lead to bad results for parties to First Amendment litigation. Even 
more concerning is when an easy case becomes easy, but the result goes to the 
wrong side. In a case where an employee is clearly not speaking to a matter of 
public concern based on the absurd content of his speech, and the result should 
easily be in favor of the employer, this per se rule indeed makes it an easy 
decision a decision for the employee. 
Take for example, our hypothetical former government employee, John. 
John is called as a character witness for his neighbor. John is called to appear in 
court, gets sworn in, and takes the stand. Neighbor s attorney asks John to 
describe Neighbor for the jury. John opens with, Neighbor is a good guy, for a 
black man.  After this racist answer, Neighbor s attorney quickly shifts the 
subject and gets some good responses from John before ending his direct. On 
cross, for the sake of impeachment by bias, opposing counsel manages to get 
John to openly respond with a litany of racist comments and remarks. For the 
sake of making this case even easier, John at one point uses a racist epithet 
beginning with the letter n  to describe Neighbor. When word of this testimony 
reaches John s government employer, it fires him. John files suit claiming that 
this termination violates his First Amendment rights. Under the per se rule, John 
would be correct and be able to force the jury into a balancing test, weighing the 
interest of the government in promoting the efficiency of the public service 
against John s free speech interests. After all, John responded truthfully to 
questions, he just happens to be openly racist. A case that should have been easy 
to win for the government employer, instead becomes easy to win for the 
government employee.
153 Id.
154  Judges aim for efficiency, and if they do not, they should strive to. Richard A. Posner, The 
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487, 488 (1980). 
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This rule s ability to make hard cases easy may be good for some cases; 
however, it can certainly be problematic. Sometimes hard cases should be hard. 
These are often cases of great importance that will guide lower courts in the 
future. If the content of speech is important in a case, that content should rightly 
be examined to reach a decision. A per se rule should not operate as a cop-out to 
make these hard cases easy. 
Take, for example, Jane, a hypothetical prison guard. Jane is called as a 
character witness in her friend Sally s sexual assault case. When asked whether 
Sally has changed since the alleged sexual assault, Jane responds in the 
affirmative. On cross, when asked why she thinks this has anything to do with 
an alleged sexual assault, Jane states that she s seen such changes occur before 
on multiple occasions. Through further questions, Jane reveals that multiple 
female guards at the prison have been sexually assaulted. Just like John s
employer above, Jane s employer terminates her for making it look bad and 
affecting the operation of the prison. Jane files suit. A court in Jane s case would 
be left with a hard question. The original purpose of Jane s testimony was simply 
to assert that her friend seemed to have experienced sexual assault, a private 
matter. As the questioning continued, did Jane s purpose change? It seems that 
sexual assault of government employees should be a matter of public concern, 
but perhaps the employee s purpose or specific situation is important. This is a 
hard case that could be decided either way, and the content of the speech is 
certainly worth examining for future cases. However, the per se rule of some 
circuits makes this hard case easy to decide as the content of Jane s speech would 
not even be in question. Maybe Jane was speaking on a matter of public concern, 
and maybe she was not, but at times, justice requires a hard case to be hard to 
decide. 
This per se rule does have certain advantages. For those that believe law 
should be efficient and who find the law and economics analyses of judicial 
economy compelling, a per se rule would seem attractive. After all, in a case 
where the content of an employee s speech would clearly show that they were 
testifying on a matter of public concern, if the analysis can end even sooner, then 
judicial economy has been furthered. The federal courts openly promote judicial 
efficiency, mentioning it no less than four times on the front page of their 
strategic plan.155 This is certainly a valid goal; however, it completely eliminates 
a content analysis in cases where the speech was testimony, and a goal of judicial 
efficiency cannot outweigh the need to examine content, particularly in hard 
cases. 
No case concerning speech given as testimony is hard to decide under 
this per se rule. This can be a good thing at times. Where speech is clearly on a 
matter of public concern based on the content of said speech, this rule does no 
harm by ending an examination of the second prong of a Garcetti Pickering
155 Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/strategic-plan-federal-judiciary (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
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analysis at context, as the result is the same. In hard cases where the content is a 
close call, allowing the context to be a sort of tie breaker also leads to the same 
result. The problem in these cases is not the result, but the fact that in those cases 
where an analysis of content could guide lower courts, it is not examined at all. 
B. A Simple Case-By-Case Analysis Fails To Account for the Importance 
of Testimony Under Oath 
Where the Third and Fifth Circuits ignore the content of employee 
speech, the greatest failure of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
is that they ignore the context of employee speech. A rule that so heavily 
examines the content of a public employee s speech while affording little to no 
weight to the context is also incorrect. The circuits that use a strict case-by-case 
approach, even when a public employee is testifying under oath, do not afford 
proper weight to the context of the employee s speech. In these circuits it seems 
that the courts found the content of testimony to be so compelling that it fully 
outweighed the context of the speech in question. 
This approach fails to take the context of speech into account at all in 
practice. In Connick, the Supreme Court required the context of speech to be 
analyzed.156 However, most circuits employing a case-by-case analysis glossed 
over the context of the employee s speech. The Tenth Circuit did mention the 
context of the employee s speech in Butler,157 but it did not fully address it. Judge 
Carlos F. Lucero s dissent addressed this concern: My colleagues recognize the 
form and context of Butler s speech in a judicial proceeding weigh in favor of 
treating it as a matter of public concern,  yet proceed to engage in a myopic 
analysis of the content alone to declare the speech was not a matter of public 
concern. 158
In the other circuits employing this approach the context of an 
employee s speech was afforded even less weight. The Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits largely ignored the context of the speech while elevating content over 
context.159 The Eighth Circuit seemingly held that context could never overcome 
content of employee speech.160 The Eleventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the 
facts in holding that a private, administrative hearing was not a public context,161
but the question remains whether that is any less of a public context. A sealed 
hearing can be vitally important to the public, and the testimony of an 
156  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
157  Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651 (10th Cir. 2019). 
158 Id. at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
159 See Wright v. Ill. Dep t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1501, 1503 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988).
160  Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 996 97 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the testimony in this case was compelled testimony). 
161  Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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administrative hearing is still given under oath, raising no less of a concern 
related to the importance of truthful testimony by government employees. 
Truthful testimony is of vital importance to the American justice system. 
The purpose of the federal rules of evidence is ascertaining the truth. 162
Witnesses are sworn to truthful testimony,163 witnesses can be attacked for 
untruthfulness,164 and when witnesses testify to outside statements not under 
oath, the statements are excludable hearsay.165
Our justice system goes so far as to criminalize lying under oath.166
Indeed, [a]nyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and 
society at large, to tell the truth. 167 Further, [p]erjured testimony is an obvious 
and flagrant affront to the basic concept[] of judicial proceedings. 168 The context 
of speech given is vitally important, as is the content. To ignore the context of 
sworn testimony is to ignore a vitally important tenet of the American justice 
system. 
The circuits utilizing a case-by-case approach also raise issues under an 
easy-case-hard-case analysis. Hard cases become harder to decide. Cases that 
should be easy also become harder to decide. This creates serious judicial 
economy concerns. More cases will go to trial, and more of these tried cases may 
be appealed. 
Ignoring the context of testimony, even if it is only in practice, makes 
easy cases hard and hard cases harder. Take, for example Joe, a hypothetical 
government employee in one of these case-by-case circuits. Joe testifies about 
the hiring practices of his department. Joe testifies that his department hires in a 
discriminatory manner that excludes women. Joe is testifying in a public context, 
and Joe is testifying to content of public concern. The courts in these circuits 
would be forced to do an in-depth analysis to reach the clear conclusion that Joe 
is testifying on content of public concern. This case becomes harder where 
content must be analyzed if that analysis could end with a context analysis. The 
rule in these circuits thereby make easy cases harder. 
Without truly taking context into account, cases that are justly hard 
become even harder. Take the Jane hypothetical explored above. Where the per 
se rule allows a court to make a decision far too easily, an examination that only 
concerns content in these circuits, while ignoring context, makes a hard decision 
for a court even harder. Where the decision could truly go either way, and context 
162  FED. R. EVID. 102. 
163  FED. R. EVID. 603. 
164  FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
165  FED. R. EVID. 801. 
166  18 U.S.C.A. § 1623 (West 2020). 
167  Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014). 
168  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976). 
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could be an effective tie breaker the per se rule is not the best approach. A case-
by-case analysis sounds good in practice but results in ignoring context. 
VI. IMPLEMENTING A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
Courts should adopt a new test, implementing a rebuttable presumption 
that public employees are speaking on a matter of public concern when testifying 
truthfully under oath. The current circuit split cannot stand as practitioners of law 
must treat like cases alike. 169 This rebuttable presumption would take the 
reasoning of circuits on both sides of the split to create an easily implementable 
rule that in effect constitutes a compromise of both positions. The test would 
allow proper analysis of both context and content. It would further highlight the 
importance of truthful testimony by all citizens and by government employees in 
particular. The presumption would be rebutted if the employer could show that 
an employee had perjured themselves; this rebuttable presumption would only 
protect truthful testimony. Such a rebuttable presumption would not contradict 
any current Supreme Court holdings and would simply add a new step. Finally, 
this presumption would best fit an easy-case-hard-case analysis. 
A rebuttable presumption that a public employee is speaking on a matter 
of public concern is the best way for courts to analyze both content and context, 
as the Supreme Court required in Connick.170 The per se rule of some circuits 
ignores the content of speech when a public employee is testifying. The case-by-
case analysis approach of some circuits largely ignores the context of speech in 
practice by focusing almost entirely on its content. A rebuttable presumption 
gives proper emphasis to both context and content. In practice, it would give the 
correct weight to context, so that a government employer by sufficiently 
showing that the content of the speech is on such a private matter could 
overcome the context of the speech. 
The Court has already found subpoenaed testimony to be persuasive 
when determining if a public employee is speaking on a matter of public 
concern.171 A rebuttable presumption would preserve the importance that the 
American legal system places on truthful testimony. It makes little sense to place 
a public employee between a rock and a hard place where the rock is 
unemployment and the hard place is truthful testimony. As the Tenth Circuit 
noted, testifying can have repercussions.172
Witnesses can be intimidated, attacked, or even murdered to silence 
them in various proceedings. However, our legal system has outlawed such 
169  H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1961). 
170  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 48 (1983). 
171 See Lane, 573 U.S. 228. 
172  Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651, 660 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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tampering,173 not used it to justify rules of law. We should not encourage getting 
witnesses caught between a rock and a hard place when testifying. Ignoring 
context does just this. 
A rebuttable presumption protects the importance of truthful testimony. 
The Court has even recently noted that [t]here is considerable value, moreover, 
in encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees. 174 If the 
purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is ascertaining the truth, and those 
testifying have an obligation to society at large to testify truthfully, then a 
rebuttable presumption makes the most sense to encourage said truthfulness. 
Public employees should not fear losing their job when taking the witness stand; 
they should only be concerned with telling the truth. A straight case-by-case 
analysis does not afford the context of truthful testimony the weight that it 
deserves. 
Implementing a rebuttable presumption does not contradict the current 
interpretation of the law promulgated by the Supreme Court; it simply adds one 
more step. It also seems to be the next logical move in light of the Court s recent 
decision in Lane v. Franks,175 when the Court used the context of subpoenaed 
testimony as part of its inquiry.176 The first step in a freedom of speech claim by 
a public employee is whether or not he is speaking as a citizen.177 The second 
step asks whether he is speaking on a matter of public concern.178 The Supreme 
Court has directed lower courts to analyze both the context and the content.179
The Court has also found that the First Amendment protects public employees 
providing truthful testimony subject to a subpoena on matters outside the scope 
of their official duties.180 This rebuttable presumption would simply add a caveat 
to the second prong of a Garcetti Pickering analysis. It would also follow from 
the Court s decision in Lane.181 Public employees should be protected by this 
proposed presumption whether or not their testimony is pursuant to a subpoena. 
It should extend automatically when testifying, and the government employer 
could attempt to rebut the presumption. 
Following the easy-case-hard-case analysis engaged in above, a 
rebuttable presumption would be most effective at allowing courts to reach the 
correct holding, for the correct reasons, and in an efficient manner. Easy cases 
would become even easier to decide, for the correct side. Certain hard cases 
173  18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 2020). 
174 Lane, 573 U.S. at 236. 
175  573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
176 See id.
177 Butler, 920 F.3d. at 655. 
178 Id.
179  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 48 (1983). 
180 Lane, 573 U.S. at 238. 
181 See id. at 246. 
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would become easier to decide as well. However, those hard cases that are 
difficult to decide would not become overly simplistic because such cases should 
be difficult to decide at times given the nature of the issue. The examples used 
above in the prior easy-case-hard-case analyses would be decided correctly and 
as efficiently as possible when utilizing a rebuttable presumption. Finally, the 
litany of former Supreme Court cases on the topic of speech in the public sector 
would all be decided the same way, in a more efficient manner. 
Under a rebuttable presumption, easy cases would remain easy to solve 
and may become even easier for the courts. Unlike a per se rule, these easy cases 
would not be easily decided for the wrong side. Unlike a case-by-case analysis, 
the context of the speech would not be ignored, but rather examined first, 
furthering judicial economy in some cases. Take for example the hypothetical 
used above where John takes the stand and, while testifying, truthfully makes 
several racist statements. As explained above, if his employer fires him for these 
statements, John should not be able to recover. However, under a per se rule, 
John would win out on the second step as he was testifying. Under a rebuttable 
presumption, John would win as to context, but his employer could quickly 
produce a transcript of his testimony in court and show that the content of John s
speech was on such a private matter the racist feelings he held towards his 
neighbor that his speech would fail to qualify as a matter of public concern. 
This case would come out correctly and efficiently were the courts to implement 
a rebuttable presumption. 
Under a rebuttable presumption, hard cases would become easier to 
solve, while not becoming overly simplistic. In the Jane hypothetical above, a 
hard case to decide, a rebuttable presumption would make it easier on the courts. 
Starting with a presumption in place, Jane s testimony in court would create a 
rebuttable presumption that she was speaking to a matter of public concern. The 
government would be forced to show that the content of her speech was on a 
private matter to overcome the presumption. While courts could decide this 
either way still, it would seem more likely that Jane s testimony about sexual 
assault would qualify as a matter of public concern with a presumption in place. 
This presumption would further judicial economy in making the case easier to 
decide. Jane would also be encouraged to testify truthfully, as the American 
judicial system requires. In this case, not only would a hard case become easier 
to decide, but tenets of judicial economy and truthfulness in testimony would be 
furthered. Again, this case would come out correctly and efficiently were the 
courts to implement a rebuttable presumption. 
Finally, in the hypothetical case of Joe, where a government employee 
testifies about discriminatory government hiring practices, an easy case would 
become even easier. In the case-by-case-analysis circuits, this case could take up 
quite a bit of court time as both sides argue over the content of the speech. If a 
rebuttable presumption were implemented this case would be over quickly. The 
presumption would be that Joe was speaking to a matter of public concern 
because he was testifying in court. The government would likely fail to overcome 
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this presumption with the content of their speech. This case would come out 
correctly and for the correct side were the courts to implement a rebuttable 
presumption. 
If implemented, this rebuttable presumption would not conflict with 
former Supreme Court decisions in this area of law. None of the former Supreme 
Court cases have addressed this issue. However, in each of these cases if the 
employees had been testifying when they spoke, then the outcomes likely would 
still be the same. 
In Pickering,182 if the teacher had testified about school funding rather 
than written to a newspaper, the decision would have been even easier with a 
rebuttable presumption. It would have been presumed that the teacher was 
speaking on a matter of public concern based on the context, and the government 
would not have overcome this with a content argument. In Givhan,183 if the 
employee had been speaking publicly by testifying, rather than speaking in 
private with a supervisor, the courts would have reached the same decision that 
they did, more quickly. A rebuttable presumption would have meant that the 
Court would never have had to analyze the content of the speech but could have 
stopped when the government could not overcome the presumption by showing 
the content was sufficiently private in nature. In Givhan, the Court would have 
reached the same decision, but the onus would have been on the government to 
try to prove that discussion of presidential assassinations was a private matter. In 
Rankin,184 had he been testifying rather than speaking privately to a fellow 
employee, the Court could have started with the rebuttable presumption and 
found that the government had not overcome its burden in order to reach the 
correct holding even more quickly. The result in Lane185 should not change 
simply because the testimony was not given pursuant to a subpoena, and the 
government would have similarly failed to show that the content was on a private 
matter.
Connick186 was the first of the cases in this field where the Supreme 
Court found the employee did not speak on a matter of public concern. The Court 
could have reached this same result with a rebuttable presumption in place. Had 
the employee been testifying in Connick, the presumption could have been 
overcome by the government showing that the employee was simply gather[ing] 
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors, 187 just as they 
found in the original case. Had the officer in Roe188 been testifying about the 
182  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
183  Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
184  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
185 Lane, 573 U.S. 228. 
186  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
187 Id.
188  City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
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videos he produced, the government could still overcome the presumption by 
easily showing that stripping and masturbating on video are not matters of public 
concern. 
Garcetti189 was decided based on prong one, but had the employee been 
speaking as a citizen, rather than speaking as an employee, the Court could have 
more easily decided prong two if a rebuttable presumption existed. 
In the cases where the Court did decide that the employee s speech was 
protected, a rebuttable presumption would further judicial economy. In all of 
these cases the employee was not testifying. If all other facts were the same, but 
the employee had been testifying, a rebuttable presumption would allow the court 
to reach the same decision more quickly making hard cases easier thus 
furthering judicial economy. In the cases where the Court decided that the 
employee was not speaking on a matter of public concern, a rebuttable 
presumption would not necessarily change the outcome even if the employee had 
been testifying. The government could clearly overcome the presumption in Roe
by showing how private in nature the content of the officer s speech had been. 
In Connick, the government would also have been tasked with rebutting the 
presumption, and it seems it would be able to do so. A rebuttable presumption 
would have allowed the Court to properly examine the context of the speech 
before the government could move forward and show that the employee was 
speaking on a private grievance. 
VII. REBUTTING THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
[T]he party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of 
producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the 
burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally. 190 If a 
government employee were to bring suit alleging wrongful discipline or 
termination due to speech, the employee would have the burden of proof in court. 
If a rebuttable presumption were implemented to support public employees 
testifying truthfully under oath, the burden would be upon the government 
employer to rebut the presumption that the employee was speaking on a matter 
of public concern, but the ultimate burden of persuasion would still be on the 
employee. 
This would not shift the burden of persuasion onto the government 
employer to prove that its actions were justified. In fact, the government 
employer could even concede that its employee was speaking on a matter of 
public concern by opting not to rebut the presumption and still potentially win a 
case through the remaining three steps. While this Note only addresses a change 
in prong two of a Garcetti Pickering analysis, it is important to remember that 
189  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
190  FED. R. EVID. 301. 
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this prong is only the second of five prongs.191 The Supreme Court has already 
held that truthful testimony under oath qualifies as citizen speech.192 Therefore, 
when government employees testify truthfully under oath, they have already 
satisfied the first prong of the analysis. If the premise of this Note were to be 
adopted by any court, the second prong of the Garcetti Pickering analysis would 
also be satisfied but subject to rebuttal by a public employee testifying 
truthfully under oath. The finder of fact in a case would still have to balance the 
employer s interest in promoting the efficiency of the workplace against the 
employee s interest in free speech.193 The employer would also be protected if 
the speech was not a motivating factor in the adverse employment action or if 
the adverse employment action would have been taken even in the absence of the 
protected speech.194
If the government were to opt to try to overcome the rebuttable 
presumption, it could do so in the same manner parties rebut other presumptions 
within the justice system. There exists a presumption of sanity in criminal 
cases195 that can be rebutted by a defendant with varying levels of evidence 
necessary to overcome it depending upon the jurisdiction.196 There also exists a 
presumption that a person is dead if he has been missing for seven years.197 Such 
a presumption can obviously be overcome by producing the missing party to 
show that he is not dead. Some jurisdictions operate with a presumption of 
paternity, where a man is presumed to be the father of a woman s child if they 
are married when the child is born.198 Minnesota, as an example, requires clear 
and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption, such as a paternity 
test.199 Some jurisdictions operate with a presumption of fraud or undue influence 
when the dominant party to a fiduciary relationship benefits.200 The Seventh 
Circuit applied a clear and convincing standard to overcome this standard as 
well.201 A rebuttable presumption of mail delivery also exists when an agency 
mails documents using a regular mail service.202
The presumption in this case could be rebutted by a government showing 
that the content of the speech is so clearly on a matter of private interest that the 
191  Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019).
192  Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014). 
193  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
194 Butler, 920 F.3d at 655. 
195  Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006). 
196 Id. at 767. 
197  Davie v. Briggs, 97 U.S. 628, 633 (1878). 
198  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 2020). 
199 Id. 
200  Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 826 (7th Cir. 2013). 
201 Id. at 827. 
202  Nibagwire v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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context of truthful testimony under oath should be overcome. This could be done 
under either a preponderance of the evidence standard that mirrors the civil 
standard of the case in question or under a clear and convincing evidence 
standard to even further elevate the importance of truthful testimony by 
government employees. While either of the above could be appropriate, it is clear 
that a bursting bubble standard would not be appropriate.203
Whichever presumption standard is chosen, the laws, rules, and policies 
encouraging truthful testimony would be best served by the implementation of a 
rebuttable presumption that a public employee is speaking on a matter of public 
concern when testifying truthfully under oath. This presumption would also 
allow the context and the content to be properly analyzed by courts when they 
rule on adverse employment actions in the public sector. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a standard rule needs to be implemented to settle this 
circuit split. The views of the Third and Fifth Circuits are not reconcilable with 
the views of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Each side has 
taken a strong stance with some solely analyzing context of speech and others 
analyzing solely the content. A much better solution allows a proper analysis of 
both, while emphasizing the vital importance of truthful testimony, particularly 
by government employees. This solution requires implementing a rebuttable 
presumption that a public employee is speaking on a matter of public concern 
when testifying truthfully under oath. This presumption allows proper respect to 
be afforded to the context of truthful testimony. However, it also allows content 
its day in court, so to speak. Were this rebuttable presumption to be implemented, 
the government could overcome it with a sufficient showing that the content of 
the speech was on such a private matter that employee discipline or termination 
was necessary. 
This rebuttable presumption satisfies the easy-case-hard-case analysis 
put forth by Ronald Dworkin, would further judicial economy, and would allow 
even-handed application of justice across the nation. It would not require 
overturning any prior Supreme Court decisions and in fact seems a next logical 
step from the recent decision in Lane. This rebuttable presumption best serves 
the interests of the courts, the citizens who take the roles of public employees, 
and the First Amendment. 
Austin Longnecker*
203  FED. R. EVID. 301 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 
7080 (1974). This disfavored bursting bubble theory requires only that the party burdened by a 
presumption introduce any iota of evidence to burst the bubble of the presumption. 
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